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The Cuban Missile Crisis represented a unique moment in the history of American foreign policy 
because it was the first time that the world faced a nuclear standoff. The threat of a third World 
War allowed US government officials to deceive the press under the guise of protecting national 
security. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the release of thousands of documents from ex-
Soviet and American archives, historians are rethinking the narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
that has been presented in the press during and after the crisis. This paper will explore the 
relationship that President Kennedy cultivated with the press to promote his political agenda and 








































Most Americans are familiar with the legend of the Cuban Missile Crisis: the 
unforgettable myth of John F. Kennedy saving the world from nuclear war. However, recent 
reexamination by historians into the archives of Cold War history has revealed that the story of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis has largely been exaggerated. Administration officials praised 
Kennedy’s toughness after the crisis. Kennedy’s hired biographer, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
described the president’s performance as “a combination of toughness and restraint, of will, 
nerve, and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated” that he “dazzled the 
world.”1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk similarly celebrated the boss’s toughness: “we were 
eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked.”2 The metaphor of a staring contest 
continued to be used for the handling of subsequent foreign policy crises. The lesson that 
appeared to be learned from Kennedy’s “staring contest” with Khrushchev was that the key to 
resolving foreign policy crises is to take a tough stance and refuse to compromise under all 
circumstances. 
 Journalists also contributed to the Cuban Missile Crisis myth created by the Kennedy 
administration. Immediately after the discovery of missiles in Cuba, inquisitive investigators 
were ready to share the story with the American people, but Kennedy stopped them. Kennedy 
hinted to Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, that he would be embarrassed if the 
“real” activity was in Berlin instead of Cuba.3 Another tactic Kennedy used to ward off 
journalists, whom he feared were getting too close to the truth, was to appeal to the journalists’ 
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sense of patriotic duty. When Kennedy got word that The New York Times was going to publish 
a story about the developing situation in Cuba, he immediately phoned Washington bureau chief, 
James Reston, and Kennedy entreated him to drop the story. “If you reveal my plan,” Kennedy 
told Reston, “Khrushchev could beat us to the draw.”4 Kennedy’s shrewd news management 
tactics worked because the press did not release a word about the developing Cuban crisis until 
after President Kennedy’s Monday night speech. 
 Furthermore, once the press published articles about the Cuban Missile Crisis, they 
articulated the typical view advanced by the administration: the missiles were “unmistakably 
offensive in purpose,” an American invasion of Cuba was “an ingenious but preposterous tale,” 
and Soviet missiles in Cuba were capable of “changing the whole balance of power.”5 
Unsurprisingly, all these assertions were carefully crafted by the Kennedy administration to 
justify Kennedy’s blockade of Cuba and potential call to action. 
 On Sunday, October 28, 1962, Khrushchev backed down, and the press hailed Kennedy 
as a national hero. The public believed that Kennedy had scared Khrushchev into submission. 
However, unbeknownst to the public, the press, and most of the Kennedy administration, Robert 
F. Kennedy orchestrated a secret deal with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in 
Washington, to make a missile trade. RFK “made clear that if the Soviets withdrew their nuclear 
missiles from Cuba,” the United States would respond by withdrawing their Jupiter missiles from 
Turkey.6 The deal was contingent on the Soviets staying silent, and the nine members of 
                                                 
4 Max Frankel, The Times of My Life and My Life with the Times (New York: Delta Trade 
Paperbacks, 1995), 247. 
5 Anthony Lewis, “U.S. Imposes Arms Blockade on Cuba,” The New York Times, October 23, 
1962; “The Backdown,” Time, November 2, 1962; “Anatomy of a Crisis,” CBS news special 
report, October 28, 1962, narrated by Charles Collingwood. CBS News Archives. 
6 Laurence Chang and Peter Kornblush, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National 
Security Archive Documents Reader (New Press, 1998), 373-89. 
4 
 
ExComm (President Kennedy’s ad-hoc Executive Committee of the National Security Council) 
who knew about the deal swore to tell no one.7 Administration officials kept their promise to 
Kennedy, and they never explicitly revealed their participation in the Turkey deal. The press also 
perceived no connection between the Turkish bases and the resolution of the crisis. When the 
United States withdrew its Turkish missiles six months after the close of the crisis, the press 
failed to detect the significance of the event. 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis is not a story of victory, as it has been recalled in American 
popular memory; rather, the Cuban Missile Crisis is a tale of political perceptions. The Cuban 
Missile Crisis is a classic case study of how an administration can manipulate the press for 
political advantage, and the consequences that all Americans suffer when the press fails to 
perform its constitutional duty to report the news.8 Continued secrecy undermined the credibility 
of insider historians, who confessed to censoring accounts of the crisis; continued secrecy 
undermined the credibility of journalists, who essentially became the voice piece for the 
administration during and after the thirteen days, and continued secrecy harmed the American 
people, who were deprived the knowledge of the subtleties of foreign policy negotiations .9 John 
F. Kennedy was the only person to emerge from the crisis unscathed; in fact, the crisis 
strengthened his international reputation of toughness. 
 Critics argue that some level of government secrecy was necessary during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Secrecy was integral during the early days of the 
crisis because it allowed the members of ExComm to devise a plan without alerting the Soviets 
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and without receiving criticism from domestic political opponents. Secrecy was also integral at 
the end of the crisis because it allowed Kennedy to orchestrate the missile swap without 
jeopardizing U.S relationships with foreign allies.10 However, the Kennedy administration used 
secrecy to their political advantage to implant a story in American popular memory “of the 
United States regaining mastery over history.”11 Before the crisis, Americans were fearful of 
Soviet economic and technological growth surpassing the American supremacy on the world 
stage. Kennedy had faced two major setbacks in the infancy of his presidency. Both during the 
Bay of Pigs and the Vienna summit, Khrushchev had emerged the victor. Republicans were 
vying for Kennedy to take an immediate and forceful response to the threat of Soviet missiles on 
the American border, and Kennedy had the sense that he would have been impeached if he had 
not immediately removed the Soviet missiles from the Western Hemisphere.12 Thus, although 
initially the Kennedy administration had used secrecy to protect the American people, they also 
used their insulation to regain American mastery over history. 
 Most historians who have studied the Cuban Missile Crisis have focused on diplomatic 
and military events. Early accounts produced by top officials in the administration lionized 
President Kennedy for standing up to Khrushchev.13 Beginning in the 1980s, Soviet and 
American administration officials conducted a series of meetings to revisit the details of the 
crisis. Information from these meetings revealed a far less flattering portrait of Kennedy; 
revisionists argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis was “a political trap of Kennedy’s own 
                                                 
10 Schwarz, Democracy in the Dark, 40. 
11James A. Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now." World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 
272. 
12 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (W.W Norton, 1969), 45.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                




making.”14 Kennedy had campaigned on the promise to take a tougher stance on Cuba than the 
Republicans, and he was worried that he would be impeached if the blockade against Cuba was 
unsuccessful.15 Revisionists describe the president’s fallibilities, and his desperate attempts to 
bring the crisis to a peaceful resolution. In 1992, Barton J. Bernstein published an article about 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Bernstein argued that Kennedy invaded Cuba for purely political 
reasons, and when the Bay of Pigs turned into a foreign policy disaster, Kennedy authorized 
covert activities to overthrow the Cuban government, which led Khrushchev to construct a 
defensive nuclear base on the island.16 In Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963, 
Michael Beschloss suggested that Kennedy lacked subtlety in solving foreign policy crises. 
Kennedy’s anti-Soviet rhetoric and crusade against the Cubans tied Khrushchev’s hands to 
retaliate against the Americans with equally incendiary force.17 Both scholars have neglected to 
take into account the press’s participation in promulgating the Kennedy legacy. 
 In the late 1990s, working with material from Soviet and American archives, scholars 
compiled more balanced and authoritative accounts of the crisis. In 1997, Ernest R. May and 
Philip D. Zelikow published The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.18 This book challenged previous conceptions of the administrative deliberations 
during the crisis. In all public accounts, administrative officials and the press emphasized JFK’s 
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unyielding position with Khrushchev. Kennedy was tough, but he was also much more flexible 
than the public record indicated. According to EXCOMM transcripts, Kennedy was “the leading 
dove in the room.” 19 Also in 1997, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali released One Hell 
of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964. Drawing from Soviet archives, their 
work offered a fresh perspective. Instead of designating heroes and villains to the Cuban Missile 
drama as other historians had done, Fursenko and Naftali assigned equal culpability to all the 
actors involved.20 Finally, in 1999, Laurence Chang and Peter Kornblush compiled documents 
from the National Security Archives into a documents reader. Like other works of this decade, 
their research challenged the official account of crisis management.21 These works seek to draw 
a more balanced portrait of the crisis, but they do not examine how the Cuban Missile Crisis 
myth became embedded in American culture. My goal is to fill in the gap of how administrative 
officials were able to peddle their version of the crisis to the press for so many years. 
 More recently, the literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis has begun to investigate how the 
Cuban Missile Crisis impacted the average American. Alice L. George has focused on how 
Americans reacted during the thirteen days of the crisis. Her work reveals the cracks in American 
confidence; for years, Americans championed the pervasive belief that the United States was 
unique and untouchable, but the Cuban Missile Crisis detonated American exceptionalism. 
During the thirteen days of terror, Americans feared they would wake up to nothing left on 
earth.22 Further research hints at the press’s role of propagating the myth. James McCartney’s 
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1994 article and James Graham’s 1998 article deal most closely with the contents of this paper. 
McCartney concludes that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “the American press abandoned its 
traditional role as a forum for debate and became part of the propaganda machine the 
administration artfully created.”23 Graham specifically focuses on how “the White House looked 
to the print press to shape American perceptions of Kennedy’s handling of foreign policy.”24 
 Scholars however, have yet to conduct detailed research into the impact that Kennedy’s 
manipulation of the press had on the handling of future foreign policy crises by administration 
officials. The first chapter of this thesis examines Kennedy’s relationship with the press. It 
argues that Kennedy developed a network of relationships with journalists to frame the 
publicized version of the crisis. Having established Kennedy’s relationship with the press, the 
second chapter examines how Kennedy used his friendship with journalists to persuade 
publishers to withhold information about the developing crisis. Finally, the third chapter explores 
how Kennedy administration insiders were able to hide a secret deal with the Soviets from the 
press and the American people. This thesis concludes by arguing that press coverage of foreign 
policy crises has not changed dramatically since the early 1960s. Examples from recent foreign 
policy crises show that in times of war or national emergency, the press supports the policy of 
the current administration.25 
 The Kennedy era marked a transition period for American journalism. Television was a 
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new medium, and Kennedy made few televised appearances throughout his presidency. Kennedy 
feared overexposure, so he looked to the printed press to shape the news.26 For this reason, my 
thesis analyzes coverage of the missile crisis from popular newspapers and magazines such as 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, 
Newsweek, and Time. These publications demonstrate the extent of public knowledge throughout 
the crisis. A major limitation to these papers is that they have been heavily edited to align with 
government policy. Since Kennedy monitored the news during the crisis, information or opinions 
that deviated from the New Frontier agenda are sparse.27 Memoirs from syndicated journalists, 
reporting at the height of the crisis, supplement the information contained in these periodicals.28 
Finally, biographies and accounts from Kennedy administrative officials provide a glimpse 
inside the White House during the most contentious moment of the Kennedy presidency.29 These 
accounts must be read with extreme caution because many were published for the purpose of 
preserving the Kennedy legacy. Since the close of the crisis, administrative officials have 
admitted to fabricating details and facts contained in their books. To give one example, Ted 
Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter, confessed at a 1989 meeting in Moscow between Soviet and 
American officials that he had edited the secret missile swap out of Robert Kennedy’s 
posthumous memoir, Thirteen Days.30 Kennedy believed “that history would be based upon the 
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printed word, “so he controlled the flow of information during the crisis not only to prevent 
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Chapter I: The President and the Press 
  The press coverage of presidents can make or break a presidency.32 News media possess 
tremendous power to influence the public attitudes about a particular president. President 
Johnson and President Nixon cite the press as a primary reason for their unpopularity.33 
Secretary of State George Shultz complained about the biased media coverage of the U.S. 
invasion of Grenada in 1983. He claimed that during World War II and earlier times “the press 
had always been on our side.”34 
Although journalists were generally trusting of the president, most presidents have had 
some disagreements with the press.35 The adversarial relationship between president and press 
stems from the president’s desire to release favorable information and withhold unfavorable 
information. All presidents have managed the news in some form, but Arthur Krock coined the 
term “news management” during the Kennedy presidency because of JFK’s skill at manipulating 
the press to effectively censor public information during most of his presidency.36  
The positive reports printed about Kennedy during and after the crisis raises the question 
of how Kennedy was able to manipulate the news. The simple answer is that Kennedy cultivated 
friendships with journalists, editors, and publishers before he became president, so that once in 
office, he could appeal to his friends’ patriotic sensibilities. This answer raises more complicated 
questions such as, were there any journalists who opposed the president? Or, were members of 
the press aware of Kennedy’s information management strategy? Kennedy may have been more 
                                                 
32 Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1980). 
33Nacos, Brigitte, The Press, Presidents, and Crises, 3. 
34 Harrison Raine, “Media always against us,” Daily News (New York), 25. 
35 Nacos, The Press, Presidents, and Crises, 1. 
36 Salinger, With Kennedy, 296. 
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flexible in his foreign policies than he was willing to let the public know, but one thing is sure: 
Kennedy was unmatched in his ability to control the story. 
This chapter argues that following the Bay of Pigs embarrassment, Cuba became 
Kennedy’s “heaviest political cross.”37 Kennedy learned his lesson from the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion, and in the months that followed, he tried to resurrect his public image. He blamed 
reporters for notifying Khrushchev and the Cubans about his operational plans.38 From then on, 
Kennedy changed his media strategy: he became highly secretive about all activities occurring 
inside the White House, and he only granted media access to journalists, whom he knew would 
publish favorable stories. 
First, this chapter begins by examining John F. Kennedy’s symbiotic relationship with the 
press. There were a few terse moments when journalists became annoyed with Kennedy’s media 
management, but, on the whole, the relationship between the president and the press was 
generally cooperative. The chapter argues that the press trusted the president’s judgement during 
the pre-Vietnam era. Next, the chapter examines how the Bay of Pigs contributed to Kennedy’s 
political agenda. Finally, the chapter closes by examining how the press changed their media 
strategy in response to the heightening of a potential showdown with the Soviets. 
 
Carrot and Stick 
George Reedy, one of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s press secretaries, described 
Kennedy and the Roosevelts as the only presidents “who truly understood the working of the 
press.”39 JFK modeled his media-relations strategy after Franklin Roosevelt, who had 
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successfully monitored the mass media to reap overwhelming public support.40 Before becoming 
president, Kennedy had ardently read Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power to develop a media 
relations strategy. Neustadt argued that the key to a successful presidency was “the professional 
reputation and public prestige of the presidential power.”41 Kennedy took this message to heart, 
and he used public opinion to measure the success of his presidency. Most Americans read about 
the news in daily papers, so Kennedy influenced public perception by framing his agenda in the 
papers. 
Before becoming president, Kennedy worked as a special correspondent for the Hearst 
newspaper; from his experience covering the Potsdam Conference, Kennedy learned how 
journalists collected information to write a story.42 Upon entering the White House, Kennedy 
cultivated a network of journalists, editors, and publishers, whom he fed select information to 
shape his presidential legacy.43 Kennedy ran the White House like a newspaper and every 
journalist wanted a favorable relationship with the president to gain access to insider 
information. One reporter described the White House as follows: “during the Thousand days of 
Camelot, reporters were romanced with invitations to glittering state dinners, luncheons, and 
receptions at the White House on a scale unmatched by previous administrations.”44 
But the relationship between the press and the president was not always so cooperative. 
Kennedy was “not only the friendliest, but the most thin-skinned of presidents.”45 One bad word 
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about Kennedy or any of his policies, and reporters would see their White House interview 
access revoked. Historians have described Kennedy’s press management strategy as the carrot 
and stick approach. Kennedy would dangle the possibility of exclusive inside stories to reporters 
whom he deemed his “friends,” while journalists who published stories that cast the Kennedy 
administration in an unfavorable light would struggle to get even a crumb of information.46 
Kennedy mastered the art of media relations during his presidency; by influencing 
members of the press, Kennedy used the media to highlight his strengths and gloss over his 
weaknesses. When rumors began circulating that the White House had not been forthcoming 
during the missile crisis, Arthur Sylvester defended the government’s “inherent right to lie” 
when faced with the possibility of nuclear war. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. further articulated the 
executive right to lie during foreign policy crises, but he warned that “when lies must be told, 
they should be told by subordinate officials.”47 John F. Kennedy was the first president to deal 
with the threat of a nuclear conflict; such a dire situation demanded a degree of executive secrecy 
for national security reasons. If President Kennedy had been entirely forthcoming with 
journalists, he may have precipitated a nuclear conflict. By framing the crisis in the press, he was 
able to secure the endorsement of Allies and to protect the American people. The press agreed 
that the White House had the right to withhold “sensitive” information during a “sensitive” 
situation, but that right expires as soon as the situation has been resolved. During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the lies continued after Khrushchev agreed to remove his missiles. It was only in 
the aftermath of the Cold War that the New York Times realized that they ‘had been used more 
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often than informed’.48 
 
The Bay of Pigs 
The Cuban Missile Crisis began before the discovery of missiles in Cuba. In fact, Cuba 
was a major point of contention leading up to the 1960 election. Kennedy campaigned with the 
political promise “to take a tougher stance on Cuba than the Republicans” and to “eradicate 
communism from the Western Hemisphere.”49 Once elected, both Republicans and Democrats 
expected Kennedy to fulfill his campaign promises. 
Kennedy inherited the Cuban problem from his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and 
once comfortably seated in the presidential seat of power he was forced to confront the Cuban 
problem straight-away. In early 1960, Eisenhower had authorized a CIA-Cuban exile project to 
overthrow the Castro regime, and less than a few weeks into his presidency, Kennedy endorsed 
the plan. He did not want the world to interpret the paramilitary operation as a direct US attack 
on Cuba, so he revised the plan to make the American hand more invisible. He made two major 
revisions that sealed the fate of the operation. First, he changed the landing time of the operation 
from a daylight landing to an “unspectacular landing at night.”50 Second, he changed the landing 
location from the insulated Escambray Mountains to the unprotected Bay of Pigs. This plan 
entailed new risks because if the counterrevolutionaries did not secure the beachhead before the 
Cuban forces arrived, then the guerilla fighters would be left defenseless. In addition, the 
“unspectacular landing at night” might not stir up the mass uprising necessary to make the 
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operation successful.51 Nevertheless, Kennedy had a deadline. He could either approve the plan 
or demobilize the forces. If Kennedy did not take any action toward Cuba, then Kennedy would 
demonstrate to the world that he tolerated Castro’s communist regime. Therefore, Kennedy 
decided to go forward with the operation, which would become “the worst defeat of his 
career.”52 
The press detected that Kennedy was planning a covert invasion of Cuba, and Kennedy 
quickly put to use his media management tactics. He called and consulted with bureau chiefs and 
pleaded with them to change their story. Nobody wanted to be blamed for alerting Castro’s 
forces of the invasion, so publishers edited out obvious references to the CIA or buried the story 
in the back of the paper.53 
The Cuban defense forces were taken by surprise, yet Kennedy still found cause to blame 
the media for his defeat. He lamented in a speech before newspaper publishers, “America’s 
enemies in the Cold War were able to gather information about covert operations by reading the 
newspapers.”54 This was hardly the case. Kennedy had doomed the operation when he made 
multiple changes to the CIA’s original plan. Kennedy had faced a major embarrassment when 
Adlai Stevenson, U.S. ambassador to the UN, lied about U.S. involvement in a recent air attack. 
Kennedy did not want to suffer more negative publicity, so he canceled a second airstrike on 
Castro’s air forces. This decision left a large portion of Castro’s air force still intact, which 
enabled Castro to have the upper hand in the invasion.55  
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The Cuban exiles were easy targets for Castro’s air force, and the CIA reported to Allen 
Dulles on April 17, 1961 that the operation was hopeless. Kennedy’s decisions left the Cuban 
émigré air force and the U.S. backed armada open to attack.56 Hesitant to risk direct U.S. 
involvement, Kennedy finally authorized six “unmarked” jets to defend the remaining Cuban 
exiles from air attack.57 However, even this operation failed, and the White House had to face the 
reality of the situation: the covert overthrow operation had turned into an overt rescue operation. 
Ultimately, only 14 of the 1,400 exiles were rescued, and the Bay of Pigs became a sore spot in 
Kennedy’s political career.58 
 
Defeat is an Orphan 
Publicly, Kennedy accepted responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but privately he 
blamed just about everybody else. In a meeting before newspaper publishers, Kennedy chastised 
them for publishing uncensored stories. He instructed them “to coordinate with the government 
when a story involved national security.”59 
Kennedy continued to put his spin on the story by having trusted members of his inner 
circle emphasize to journalists that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sanctioned the operation. Over 
lunch, Robert F. Kennedy expressed this rationalization to Hanson Baldwin, the national security 
reporter for the New York Times. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. repeated the same sentiment to Herbert 
Matthews of the New York Times and Robert Estabrook of the Washington Post. Even the 
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president, himself, circulated his condemnation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff among his journalist 
friends.60 
Despite his attempts to play damage control, Kennedy could not prevent the press from 
publishing negative comments about his presidency. In Time’s September 1961 issue of Fortune, 
Charles V. Murphy blamed the president for the Bay of Pigs failure. Kennedy covertly 
dispatched General Maxwell Taylor to meet with Henry Luce, the publisher. Luce was not happy 
to be scolded for his publication, but he agreed that unity was paramount to deter Khrushchev 
and the communists.61 
The Bay of Pigs brought John F. Kennedy the worst possible outcome: Castro publicly 
declared himself a communist and Kennedy lost the faith of the American people.62 Before a 
room full of reporters, Kennedy accepted personal responsibility for the Bay of Pigs disaster. 
“There’s an old saying,” Kennedy declared, “that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an 
orphan.”63 Privately, Kennedy avowed to defeat Castro and stamp out communism from Cuba. 
The Bay of Pigs was a foreign policy nightmare, but Kennedy had learned from his defeat how to 
proceed with his Cuba policy. Instead of advertising his foreign policy plans and 
accomplishments in the press, Kennedy decided to conceal details about an upcoming Cuban 
invasion. He devised a secret American program, codenamed Operation Mongoose, to topple the 
Castro regime, while publicly announcing an embargo on Cuba.64 Unlike Operation ZAPATA, 
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Kennedy would proceed with caution, and he would wait until the time was right to disclose 
information about the operation. This time Kennedy would control the narrative, so that the next 
time the press published a story about Kennedy’s Cuba policy, he would be the American hero.  
 
The Cuban Question 
Over the summer, Cuba had transformed into the top issue of the 1962 election. 
Republicans were clamoring that offensive Soviet missiles were already in Cuba, but the 
president was too “soft-on-communism” to do anything about it.65 The official White House 
stance was that Cuba did not represent a real threat, and Republican calls to action were 
“reckless” and “irresponsible.”66  
In the pre-crisis period, most of the editorials published in the New York Times and the 
Washington Post were supportive of Kennedy’s Cuban policy while the editorials published in 
the Chicago Tribune were critical of Kennedy’s Cuban stand.67 This finding is not surprising 
because in the pre-election period the New York Times and the Washington Post published 
editorials in support of Kennedy’s Cuban policies while the conservative Chicago Tribune was 
critical of Kennedy’s policies.68  Following a September news conference, both the New York 
Times and the Washington Post defended the president’s statement that “the Cuban question is 
complex” and “impulsive military adventurism” will endanger the safety of the nation.69 In 
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contrast, the Chicago Tribune charged that the Soviets were constructing military bases in Cuba, 
but the Kennedy administration was too “spineless” to do anything about it.70  
As Republican calls for military intervention grew louder, President Kennedy promised 
to take action if Cuba became an offensive military base.71 Despite this promise, White House 
spokesmen were careful to keep Operation Mongoose out of the press.72 This section argues that 
Cuba was an important issue of the 1962 election, and Americans were divided over how the 
president should proceed. While the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Chicago 
Tribune published editorials both condemning and supporting the president’s policies, the 
majority of line coverage in the East Coast papers supported the President’s Cuba coverage, 
while most of the lines in the Chicago Tribune were spent criticizing Kennedy and Cuba. In 
addition, pro-administration stories more often appeared as the cover stories in the Washington 
Post and the New York Times while anti-administration stories managed to more often make the 
front page of the Chicago Tribune in the pre-crisis period.73 
Kennedy was an expert at conducting the news. He cultivated an inner circle of 
journalists, editors, and publishers to preserve his legacy in the written record. Despite his 
attempts to control the story, he could not prevent right-wing conservatives from lashing out at 
him after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Kennedy attempted to restore his reputation by publicly 
taking responsibility for the operation, but privately planning how to defeat Castro and win back 
America’s trust. Popular opinion of Kennedy dropped to an all-time low in August 1962, and 
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cries for military intervention in Cuba were growing louder and louder.74  
Historians have focused on the military and diplomatic significance of Kennedy’s 
presidency, but even more important than the Bay of Pigs and Kennedy’s Cuba policies, is what 
the pre-crisis rhetoric illustrates about American sentiment in the early 1960s. Historical studies 
emphasized the diplomatic consequences of the Bay of Pigs instead of the political consequences 
on Kennedy’s presidency. After the Bay of Pigs, Cuba was no longer a military problem, but a 
domestic political problem.75 Newspaper coverage in the buildup to the crisis offer a rare 
opportunity to peer into the American psyche. Because the White House had not yet confirmed 
the existence of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, the president had no reason to censor or 
suppress the press. Thus, the pre-crisis period provides insight into the true American sentiment 
before Kennedy began to “manage” the news. The following chapters will examine how 
Kennedy’s media strategy changed upon the discovery of missiles in Cuba. The press has a duty 
to report the news, but they are willing to hold back tidbits of information when the threat of 
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Chapter II: Secret Missiles 
The discovery of offensive nuclear missile sites in Cuba confirmed Republican 
suspicions that the Soviets were indeed building a nuclear base only ninety miles away from the 
coast of Florida. Kennedy commissioned ExComm to determine how to respond to the Soviet 
threat.76 The committee was limited to only twelve government officials to prevent U-2 
photographic evidence from leaking to the press. Nevertheless, journalists also uncovered 
evidence of Cuban missile sites before President Kennedy disclosed this information to the 
public. In the interim period between the discovery of the missile sites and Kennedy’s address to 
the nation confirming the existence of Soviet missile sites, the president and the press worked 
together to suppress the flow of information. While most reporters respected this arrangement 
given the magnitude of the situation, some columnists felt that the president was stripping 
journalists of their right to report the news.77 Despite minor grievances, the press complied with 
the president’s demands, and the nation was shocked when Kennedy confirmed that the Soviets 
were in the process of building offensive nuclear missile sites in Cuba. Government secrecy in 
the early days of the crisis was justified because it allowed ExComm the privacy to devise a plan. 
If journalists reported the news before President Kennedy devised a course of action, then the 
press could have endangered the lives of American citizens. 
Following Kennedy’s address to the nation, fear gripped the nation: millions of 
Americans fled their homes, troops prepared for battle, families stocked fallout shelters, “and 
parents in some cities bought dog tags to make identification of their children’s bodies simpler.” 
Fear was not lost on the politicians and journalists, who Alice L. George claims “rallied around 
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Kennedy like frightened children, offering almost unqualified support.” 78 
During the thirteen days of the crisis, politicians and the press spoke together with one 
voice. The president personally monitored publications, and by personally calling reporters, 
Kennedy stopped the publishing of information that might threaten national security.79 The 
White House’s control of the timing and flow of information allowed ExComm a sufficient 
amount of time to weigh U.S. options and reach a peaceful resolution. 
For almost two decades, only Kennedy’s version of the Cuban Missile Crisis was known 
by the public. It was not until historians began examining the Soviet perspective that they 
realized there were many inconsistencies in Kennedy’s account. In recent years, journalists have 
also published memoirs of the crisis that challenged the Cuban Missile Crisis myth. In light of 
new information, historians have begun to rethink the news coverage of the crisis and President 
Kennedy’s motives for managing the news. Most scholars agree that the president’s tight reins 
on the press allowed ExComm to deliberate without domestic or foreign interference.80 
However, just days after the crisis ended, The New York Times published an editorial which 
stated, “there is no doubt that a democratic government cannot work if news of and about the 
government is long suppressed, or managed, or manipulated, or controlled.”81 Thus, there is a 
fine line between legitimate government oversight and undemocratic executive management. 
Historians are divided over the president’s motives for managing the coverage of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Some scholars argue that Kennedy’s executive oversight of the press 
protected American freedom by giving the ExComm the privacy to deliberate. The suppression 
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of information during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a diplomatic strategy that granted Kennedy 
the time to endorse the support of Allies while also strengthening the U.S. position in 
negotiations with the Soviets.82 Others, like James Graham and Robert Smith Thompson argue 
that Kennedy manipulated the press for personal political advancement.83 This thesis takes the 
middle ground in this debate: initially, some government secrecy was necessary to safeguard the 
lives of the American people; however, after the crisis ended, the Kennedy administration 
continued to suppress information and deliver disinformation to preserve the American myth of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
This chapter examines President Kennedy’s motives for managing the news at the onset 
of the crisis. Legitimate foreign policy concerns prohibited the press from printing until the 
president could deliver a streamlined message to America’s foes and allies. These concerns were 
legitimate because premature leakage of inaccurate information could have prompted a nuclear 
war. This temporary secrecy protected American freedom. However, once President Kennedy’s 
speech was delivered, the press continued to promulgate the president’s message. Kennedy had 
relationships with publishers of the major newspapers, and McGeorge Bundy argues that the 
press trusted the president during the crisis because Kennedy dealt with it “directly and 
honorably;” Kennedy personally called publishers and reporters to appraise them of the situation, 
and because Kennedy took the time to inform journalists of the situation, the press trusted the 
president’s judgement to report what they had been told.84 William LeoGrande, a history 
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professor at American University, charged that the press refused “to question the basic 
assumptions and arguments advanced publicly and privately by administration spokesmen”; the 
press failed “to treat seriously the views of anyone who dissented from the administration 
position,” and the press “abdicated it’s role of independent watchdog.”85 This chapter argues that 
initially President Kennedy controlled the news for national security reasons, but since the press 
wanted to help the White House win the war on communism, Kennedy was able to influence 
reporters to only print stories that cast him in a favorable light. First, this chapter will examine 
journalists’ discovery of missiles in Cuba, and President Kennedy’s strategies for convincing 
them to withhold the news. Next, the chapter will explore how Kennedy framed his political 
agenda in the papers, specifically with regard to Soviet intentions and American actions. 
 
What’s Going on in Cuba? 
In early October 1962, journalists observed a frenzy of activity at the State Department’s 
Latin American Bureau, and they suspected that a crisis was developing in Cuba. Assistant 
Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland accidentally confirmed journalists’ suspicions when asked 
by Murrey Marder, a reporter at The Washington Post, how bad the Cuban situation looked. 
“Pretty bad,” Cleveland replied.86 On Sunday, October 21, 1962, reporters at The Washington 
Post published a story, which described the sudden amassing of American forces in the 
Southeast and prescribed Cuba as the likely destination for a Caribbean confrontation.87 
President Kennedy was not pleased. 
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Just a few days prior, after authorizing the CIA to photograph Cuban missile sites, 
Kennedy’s fears were confirmed: the Soviets were building nuclear missile sites just ninety miles 
away from the coast of Florida. The president immediately commissioned EXCOMM to devise a 
plan. During deliberations, “advisers were admonished not to talk to other government officials 
or the press.”88 To give the façade of business as usual, Kennedy kept his public schedule, 
including a black-tie ball for Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and a campaign trip to the 
Midwest.89 If Kennedy canceled these public meetings, he would set off alarm bells of danger to 
the Soviets that the United States knew about the secret missiles. Kennedy’s control of the flow 
of information in the first few days of the United States’ discovery of missiles in Cuba, allowed 
ExComm the insulation from outside pressure to reach a well-informed consensus. Yet, despite 
President Kennedy’s rigid information security measures, reporters from the Washington Post 
and The New York Times pieced together that a Cuban crisis was brewing. 
Kennedy convinced both the publisher of The Washington Post, Philip Graham, and The 
New York Times bureau chief, James Reston, to avoid publishing any stories about Cuba until he 
had the chance to publicly address the American people, the Soviets, and America’s allies. Philip 
Graham was one of Kennedy’s friends; in fact, they had just recently eaten dinner together. 
Kennedy persuaded Graham to withhold publishing about the Cuban missiles by appealing to the 
journalist’s patriotic duty to protect the American people and by promising an exclusive once 
Kennedy informed the world of the situation. Philip Graham weighed his constitutional right to 
report the news against his right as a citizen to protect innocent American lives. Ultimately, 
Graham decided that suppression of the news would save more American lives.90 
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Suppression or editing of the news is not a new practice in American history; most 
American presidents have managed the news in some form. Especially during foreign policy 
crises, presidents may control the flow of information to the press to protect national security 
concerns. President Eisenhower described the Cold War as a “life of perpetual fear and 
tension.”91 Because of the constant national security threat during the Cold War period, 
Eisenhower monitored the delivery of news to the American people. For instance, President 
Eisenhower denied that the US was flying spy planes over Soviet territory, but when the Soviets 
shot down an American U-2 plane piloted by Gary Powers, Eisenhower admitted the truth.92 By 
the time Kennedy came to office, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had 
augmented to such an extent that the appearance of strength was more important than actual 
strength.93 For this reason, Kennedy’s job as president was not only to protect Americans from 
an impending nuclear conflict, but also to reassure Americans of the strength of American 
democracy.  
Reporters at the New York Times were more skeptical than reporters at The Washington 
Post about Kennedy’s plan to suppress the Cuban coverage. After reading the Washington Post’s 
Sunday paper, Kennedy knew that journalists had learned about the developing situation in 
crisis. Not wanting the public to learn about the crisis prematurely, Kennedy instructed James 
Reston, The Times bureau chief in Washington, to notify the White House Press Secretary before 
The Times released a story.94 When Reston called National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy 
to inquire about the activity at the State Department, Kennedy realized that journalists at the  
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New York Times were close to figuring out the truth, so Kennedy immediately employed his 
press management strategies.95 When Kennedy called Reston, the journalist revealed that 
reporters at The New York Times had figured out that offensive missiles were located in Cuba. 
Kennedy confirmed the journalist’s suspicions, and the president provided Reston with more 
information about the Cuban crisis: “Do you know what I’m going to do about it? I’m going to 
order a blockade- a blockade of all Soviet shipping to Cuba. If you reveal my plan, or print that 
we discovered their missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev could beat us to the draw.”96 Kennedy further 
instructed Reston to withhold publishing until Kennedy had the “chance to address the country 
and the Russians.”97 
Not everyone at the New York Times agreed with the president’s plea to suppress the 
news. The journalist who had pieced together the story, Max Frankel thought it was 
unconstitutional for the New York Times to purposefully keep the public in the dark. Frankel 
argued that journalists at the New York Times had “a right to report the discovery of the missiles, 
which we’d doped out ourselves.”98 In the end, national security concerns convinced Frankel that 
withholding the news was the right thing to do temporarily. Journalists were Americans first, and 
in the early 1960s, they were committed to helping the president preserve democracy from the 
clutches of communism. Many journalists, including Max Frankel, realized the mistakes they 
had made in the preamble to the Bay of Pigs invasion which may have alerted the Soviets to an 
American attack. Both Kennedy and members of the American Press Corps learned after the 
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failed invasion to be more careful about the information that they made public. Consequently, 
Orvil Dryfoos, the New York Times’ publisher, changed Monday’s story to speculate about a 
possible Cuban crisis.99 Kennedy’s friendship with influential publishers, and journalists’ desire 
to prevent a nuclear war allowed the president to contain information about the Cuban crisis until 
EXCOMM determined an appropriate course of action. 
 
‘Offensive’ Missiles 
President Kennedy suppressed the news of the crisis until Monday night to frame the 
situation in America’s favor: “Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the 
fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The 
purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the 
Western Hemisphere.”100 Kennedy’s speech left no room for doubt. Premier Khrushchev had 
declared war with the United States when he placed a series of ‘offensive’ missiles aimed at 
America’s heart. 
The morning after Kennedy’s speech, the American press corps published various 
statements of support for the president’s highly questionable propositions. The press did not 
challenge any of Kennedy’s bold assumptions, nor did they consider alternative viewpoints of 
the situation; instead, members of the press offered unqualified praise for the president and his 
policies. The New York Times set the tone: in his editorial on October 23, 1962, Anthony Lewis 
reiterated the president’s claim that the missiles “are unmistakably offensive in purpose.” He 
further suggested that the press did not need to investigate the Soviet motives for installing 
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missiles in Cuba because the president’s speech “confirmed” Soviet intentions.101 Other 
journalists ridiculed the possibility that the missiles could be defensive despite Khrushchev’s 
insistence that the missiles were intended to deter an American attack. William LeoGrande 
argues that the press treated the Soviet assertion that the missiles were purely defensive as a 
“Soviet lie.”102 Time magazine articulated the typical attitude among journalists: “Soviet 
assertions that their motive was the defense of Cuba constituted an ingenious but preposterous 
tale.”103 
Scholars now concede that Khrushchev’s primary motivation for the installation of 
nuclear weapons was the defense of Cuba.104. The Soviets had every reason to believe that the 
United States “would repeat the Bay of Pigs, but not make mistakes anymore.”105 Cuban 
intelligence had infiltrated CIA-exile groups, and they learned of a covert U.S. operation to 
invade Cuba in October 1962. Administration officials codenamed the top-secret program 
Operation Mongoose, and the objective of the program was the complete capitulation of the 
Castro regime. Notes from Justice Department meetings reveal that the United States intended to 
use all resources necessary to bring about “the overthrow of Castro’s regime.” Official guidelines 
for the operation stated, “that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.”106 
This evidence suggests that Khrushchev had good reason to fear an imminent U.S. invasion. 
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Despite Khrushchev’s belief that the United States planned to invade Cuba, the American 
public had no knowledge of Operation Mongoose. William LeoGrande thinks that the press’s 
failure to consider the placement of missiles from the Soviet perspective is the reason why 
Kennedy’s actions were “so quickly and universally supported.”107 While I agree that the press’s 
unilateral coverage of the crisis bolstered the public’s support in Kennedy’s response, I think 
there are many other factors that influenced the public’s faith in the righteousness of the 
American action. Tensions were high, and the threat of a nuclear war was a novel situation; the 
public was looking for a strong leader to protect the tenets of American democracy.108 
Consequently, I believe that even if the press addressed the Soviet perspective in their articles 
and editorials, the public would have accused the press of being anti-American. 
The press also failed to ask the pivotal question of why Soviet missiles in Cuba were 
automatically “offensive” while American missiles in “Turkey” were instantly “defensive.” 
James McCartney argues that this is another instance where the press failed to exercise 
independent judgement from the Kennedy administration, but I do not think that the press can 
entirely be blamed for not asking this question.109 First, the press lacked the capability to fully 
investigate whether this claim was true: communist countries were off limits to American 
reporters during the Cold War.110 In addition, McCartney is assuming that journalists have 
access to classified government documents to check the veracity of the president’s statements. 
This is simply not true. Journalists were working in a period before the Vietnam-Watergate era 
shook the public’s confidence in American democracy. The public generally trusted the president 
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during this period, so there was inadequate infrastructure in place for journalists to check the 
facts purported by the Kennedy administration. Nevertheless, ExComm advisers prepared a 
statement of defense in case the public ever questioned why Soviet bases in Cuba were 
automatically offensive and American bases in Turkey were automatically defensive, but neither 
the press nor the public ever questioned the administration’s assumption.111 Besides not 
questioning the administrative position, journalists went further to defend the administrative 
position against possible objections. Time magazine argued that “the U.S. bases…have helped to 
keep the peace since World War II, while the Russian bases in Cuba threaten to upset the 
peace.”112 The New York Times took the position that “the Western powers moved to restore a 
balance of power and did not move into new territory.” Whereas, the Soviets moved with the 
explicit purpose of “disrupting world peace.”113 The journalists’ automatic defense of American 
missiles helped the administration conceal its plan to trade the American Jupiter missiles for the 
Soviet Cuban missiles because a few months after the crisis was over, the administration quickly 
dismantled its Turkish missiles, and the press perceived no connection between the resolution of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the sudden withdrawal of the American missiles in Turkey.  
Another belief perpetuated during the Cuban Missile Crisis was that the placement of 
missiles in Cuba disrupted the nuclear balance. James McCartney argues that the press never 
questioned Kennedy’s claim that the missiles “were an unacceptable danger to the United 
States.” Instead the press exaggerated the danger, so that Kennedy would have no choice, but to 
respond to the placement of missiles in Cuba.114 In a CBS news documentary, “Anatomy of a 
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Crisis,”  reporter Charles Collingwood planted the belief that the placement of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba disrupted the “whole balance of power.”115 John W. Finney of the New York Times also 
reported that in the opinion of high administration officials, the placement of missiles in Cuba 
would tip the nuclear balance of power in favor of the Soviets.116 Although the missiles did not 
actually change the balance of power, the placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba seemed to 
strengthen the Soviet retaliatory power, and as Kennedy noted during the crisis “appearances 
contribute to reality.”117 Appearances of strategic inferiority contributed to the administration’s 
assessment that the public desired an “energetic response” to Cuba.118 
These ideas fueled by the press were intended to force the president’s hand in military 
action against Cuba. However, according to McNamara, U.S. nuclear superiority was never in 
question: the U.S. had seventeen nuclear weapons for every one of the Soviet weapons.119 Even 
the president conceded that Khrushchev’s strategy was more of a political play than a military 
challenge.120 Nevertheless, some members of the press presented the placement of nuclear 
missiles in Cuba as a challenge to American nuclear superiority. Therefore, Kennedy believed a 
show of strength was necessary to reaffirm American superiority.121  
From the first moment that Americans learned of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the press was 
on the administration’s side. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the press stopped operating as a 
forum for debate, and, instead, the media became a mouthpiece for the administration. In his 
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Cuban Missile Crisis address, the president made many offensive statements, which were 
intended to sway world opinion to the defense of America. Instead of challenging the highly 
questionable propositions of the Kennedy administration, the press defended these propositions 
without a reasonable justification. Members of the press did not examine alternative viewpoints 
of the crisis, nor did they check the veracity of the president’s statements; they simply reiterated 
word by word, lie by lie, all the ‘facts’ that the administration took to be true. Without questions 
or challenges from the media, Kennedy sold his version of the crisis to the public, and he was 
able to win back the hearts and minds of the American people while also reestablishing his 
international image of American toughness. 
 
American Action 
Kennedy’s speech on October 28, 1962, was explicitly shroud in incendiary language for 
the purpose of appeasing his political opponents and regaining international favor. Kennedy had 
campaigned on the promise to be tougher on Cuba than the Republicans and to eradicate 
communism from the Western Hemisphere. Americans, especially Republicans, were 
disappointed that the president had failed to live up to his 1960 promise. Although still quite 
high, a 1961 Gallup poll showed Kennedy’s popularity dipping below the 70 percent mark after 
the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.122 When U-2 surveillance photos showed missiles in Cuba, 
Kennedy had one more chance to stand up to Castro and Khrushchev, and he had one more 
opportunity to imprint his lasting legacy in history. 
Consequently, when ExComm members were discussing possible responses to the Cuban 
crisis, diplomacy simply wasn’t an option for domestic political reasons. The committee 
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considered an air strike, invasion, or blockade in response to Khrushchev, and the group was 
divided between a blockade and an air strike. Kennedy leaned more towards moderate action, but 
for the sake of America’s international credibility, it was paramount that the administration make 
a show of strength.123 
After the blockade went into effect, Kennedy scrambled to control the Cuban missile 
narrative. Kennedy exercised tight management over the press and the stories they were 
reporting. Kennedy’s oversight bordered close on censorship, but the press tolerated the 
president’s executive management of the papers because they believed that they were helping the 
White House win the war on communism. After the president’s Monday night speech, the State 
Department granted interviews to 125 reporters. Publishers and journalists, who Kennedy knew 
personally, such as Stewart Alsop, James Reston, Walter Lippmann, and Philip Graham, were 
given private interviews by EXCOMM members. Finally, journalists that Kennedy considered 
close friends, such as Charles Bartlett, had the privilege of receiving exclusive information about 
the crisis from the commander-in-chief.124 The key to information access during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was political favor; reporters who wrote insensitive stories about the Kennedy 
administration were left in the dark. 
One such journalist who was reprimanded by the Kennedy administration for writing 
unflattering articles about the president was Arthur Krock of the New York Times. Krock argued 
that the Kennedy administration had known about the missile sites weeks in advance of the 
public. The announcement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was conveniently timed to influence the 
election. Kennedy did not take public criticism lightly, so he dispatched John McCone, director 
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of the CIA, to educate Krock about how quickly missile sites can be set up.125 Although Krock 
was correct: the administration had known about the missiles many days before informing the 
American people, he was publicly ridiculed for not understanding the severity of the situation. 
By the middle of October 1962, Kennedy learned that the Soviets had deployed missiles 
into Cuba. The president found himself in uncharted territory: no former commander-in-chief 
had to deal with the threat of impending nuclear conflict. The rhetoric of the Cold War required 
that Kennedy put on a show of strength. Clark Clifford advisor to Harry Truman informed the 
president in the early days of the Cold War: “Compromise and concessions are considered, by 
the Soviets, to be evidence of weakness and they are encouraged by our ‘retreats’ to make new 
and greater demands.”126 This sentiment carried over to the Kennedy presidency, and especially 
after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had the impetus to show Khrushchev that despite the failed 
invasion, the American president would not capitulate so easily. Therefore, publicly, Kennedy 
used the press to present the strength of “American will and resolve,” while privately he used 
private channels to secure a diplomatic solution with Khrushchev. This strategy allowed the 
president to insulate foreign policy from domestic politics while he secured support from 
America’s allies. In times of a national crisis, information control is necessary, if not required, to 
safeguard the lives of the American people. The difference between the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
other foreign policy crises was that Kennedy and members of his administration continued to 
control the flow of information long after the crisis ended. Information that was omitted or 
changed for national security reasons soon became embedded in the history of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis to protect the sentiment of American superiority. 
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Chapter III: Secret Deal 
As the crisis continued and a peaceful outcome seemed uncertain, the public trembled on 
the brink of nuclear war. However, only a few members of the Kennedy administration were 
aware of all the precautions the president had taken to prevent nuclear war. While the press 
presented a tough image of Kennedy to reassure the American public and NATO, privately 
Kennedy worked through back channels to strike a deal with Khrushchev. The missile crisis 
reached its climax during the weekend when Khrushchev sent two private letters to the president. 
Departing from diplomatic tradition, Kennedy publicly responded to the letter with more 
favorable terms.127 This left Khrushchev in the uncomfortable position of accepting the 
president’s offer or preparing for military confrontation. On Sunday, October 28, 1962, 
Khrushchev accepted Kennedy’s offer, and the public celebrated on what appeared to be an 
American victory. Statesmen and journalists celebrated the United States reaffirming mastery on 
the global stage. In a Life editorial, Henry Luce rearticulated the responsibility of America as the 
dominant global power “to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence” to bring about 
a more peaceful world order.128 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of the Planning Council of the 
Department of State declared that the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the limits of the Soviet 
nuclear capabilities. He concluded that “the U.S. is today the only effective global military 
power in the whole world.”129 In the aftermath of the crisis, Kennedy used the reemerging 
confidence in American military superiority to craft his version of the Missile Crisis. Advisers to 
the president spoke of Kennedy’s nerve and wisdom, and they deliberately deemphasized the 
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role of back-channel diplomacy in resolving the crisis.130 Kennedy continued to preserve his 
legacy as a Cold War warrior by restricting information access after the crisis was over. The 
president granted an exclusive interview to Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop; their “Profile in 
Courage” became the official account of the crisis, and Kennedy had the benefit of editing their 
story before it was published.131 Thus, the missile crisis became a tale of heroic military 
leadership, and the lessons that appeared to be learned from the confrontation was that crises 
could be mastered. Some foreign policy analysts argue that this pervasive belief continues to 
harm U.S. foreign relations today. 
This chapter first examines how journalists worked with the president to help him attain a 
diplomatic solution. Kennedy nurtured close friendships with many reporters to help him defeat 
communism. Then, it examines the secret missile deal that Robert F. Kennedy made with the 
Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Finally, it examines how President Kennedy covered up 
the missile deal in the press and how he was able to write his tough version as the historical 
account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When Kennedy was assassinated shortly after the missile 
crisis, the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis that Kennedy and his advisers had constructed 
became enshrined in the history of the Kennedy legacy. 
 
Back-Channel Diplomacy 
In the heat of the crisis, back-channel diplomacy was an effective way for Kennedy to 
convey to Khrushchev that he was willing to trade missile bases in Turkey for missile bases in 
Cuba. Kennedy couldn’t publicly admit that he was contemplating a diplomatic solution because 
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“America’s international credibility required demonstrating America’s strength and resolve to 
the world.”132 Consequently, Kennedy dispatched trusted journalists to convey his willingness to 
trade missiles to KGB agents. 
Journalists used two strategies to help resolve the missile crisis: they either met with 
Soviet agents to suggest diplomatic solutions, or they published articles, which urged the 
president to consider peaceful options. Robert Kennedy later observed that “the luckiest thing in 
the world” had been the president’s control of the timing and flow of information in the press.133 
Kennedy’s ability to keep up a tough public image while privately negotiating a diplomatic 
solution allowed the U.S. to secure the endorsement of allies and to strengthen the U.S. position 
with the Soviets. 
Although Kennedy believed his efforts at back-channel diplomacy to be successful, 
recent evidence suggests that KGB agents did not consider journalists as a reliable conduit to the 
president, so they did not report information from their meetings with American journalists to the 
Kremlin. Nevertheless, the Kennedy brothers thought that back-channel meetings between 
American journalists and KGB agents would successfully resolve the crisis because these 
meetings allowed Kennedy to convey his flexibility to Khrushchev without appearing weak to 
the public. On October 23, 1962, both Charles Bartlett and Frank Holeman met with Georgi 
Bolshakov of the KGB to inform him that the president wanted to trade missiles in Cuba for 
missiles in Turkey.134 On October 24, 1962, after the blockade went into effect, Robert Kennedy 
dispatched Bartlett once again to meet with Bolshakov. This time, Bartlett informed Bolshakov 
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that despite JFK’s tough rhetoric, “the President does not want to invade Cuba.” 135 The Kennedy 
brothers believed that their diplomatic endeavors had found fertile ground when Khrushchev 
agreed to a compromise; however, the information from these meetings never left Bolshakov’s 
desk.  
Historians continue to debate the role that journalists played in resolving the crisis. 
Specifically, historians have questioned whether John Scali of ABC news helped resolve the 
crisis. Initially, historians thought that Scali brought information about a missile swap to the 
Kremlin’s attention. Alexander Fomin, the KGB station chief at the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington reached out to Scali to inform him that “missile bases would be dismantled under 
United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any 
kind, ever in return for a pledge not to invade Cuba.”136 Shalom Sokolow argues that Scali could 
have reported this information on live television, but Scali, knowing the delicate nature of 
foreign policy negotiations, took this information straight to Roger Hilsman, the director of 
Intelligence at the State Department.137 
Upon analysis of Soviet cables sent during the crisis, historians debate the importance of 
Scali and other journalists in helping to resolve the missile crisis. Soviet documents reveal that 
Scali contacted Fomin, and Khrushchev did not view Scali or other journalists as a channel to 
Kennedy. In addition, the pledges made by Scali and Fomin appear redundant because by the 
time Fomin’s cable reached the Kremlin, Khrushchev and Kennedy already agreed to trade 
missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey.138 Even though Scali’s meetings with Fomin may not 
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have been the primary factor to resolve the crisis, these meetings may have prepared the Kremlin 
to accept a diplomatic solution. 
Finally, Walter Lippman of the Washington Post published a column on October 25th, 
which described his desired outcome of the missile crisis: a missile swap. Lippman had learned 
in a private briefing with the president that Kennedy was contemplating a missile swap to trade 
the aging Jupiter missiles for the newly constructed Soviet missiles.139 James Graham argues that 
this article was significant because although it deviated from Kennedy’s public image as tough 
and uncompromising, Kennedy did not demand Lippman to retract his story.140 Furthermore, 
historians believe that Khrushchev learned of Kennedy’s willingness to trade missiles through 
Lippman’s column. Khrushchev was aware of Kennedy’s friendship with journalists, so the fact 
that Kennedy did not refute Lippman’s article may have indicated to Khrushchev that Kennedy 
was willing to consider a diplomatic solution. Journalists helped resolve the missile crisis, but 
not in the way that historians originally believed; publications, not meetings, brought the 
possibility of a missile swap to the attention of the Kremlin. 
Secret Deal 
Kennedy’s efforts at back-channel diplomacy worked, and on Friday, October 26th, 
Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba if the president promised not to 
attack Cuba. The president rejoiced, he had achieved the public outcome he had desired. 
However, the next day on Radio Moscow, Khrushchev broadcast the second letter he had sent to 
Kennedy; in this letter, Khrushchev declared that he would only remove his missiles from Cuba 
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if Kennedy removed his missiles from Turkey.141 This demand put the president in a difficult 
situation. Publicly, he could not agree to the terms of Khrushchev’s request. For foreign policy 
reasons, Kennedy could not dismantle the Jupiter missiles because if he did, the US role of 
protectorate would be called into question by America’s allies.  
On Friday, October 26th, the president received startling news; U-2 photos showed that 
the Cuban missile sites were operational, and the Soviets would be able to launch an attack 
against America within a few days. The “hawks” in Kennedy’s committee pressed for the 
president to launch an invasion or an air strike, but the president was hesitant to take military 
action that might endanger the lives of the people. If the president heeded his advisers advice not 
only would America receive bad public opinion for “conducting a Pearl Harbor in reverse,” but 
also dropping a bomb would give Khrushchev reason to escalate.142 Kennedy knew that taking 
such reckless military risks would only hasten a nuclear war, so he tried to convince the 
members of ExComm that a diplomatic solution was the best strategy. 
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations discussed possible 
diplomatic solutions with ExComm. Stevenson advised for the United States to lift its quarantine 
on Cuba, pledge not to invade Cuba, agree to make the Western Hemisphere a nuclear-free zone, 
and suggest the possibility of a missile swap.143 Many of the “hawks” in the committee 
adamantly disagreed with Stevenson’s suggestions. John McCone, director of the CIA, 
articulated the typical argument of dissenters that it was too dangerous for the US to remove all 
of its defensive capabilities when the Soviets were prepared to launch a missile strike against the 
United States at any minute. For the most part, Stevenson’s suggestion for a missile swap was 
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dismissed by ExComm committee members as a pacifist strategy, and the committee continued 
to plan military strategies to forcibly remove the Cuban missiles.144 The idea of a missile swap 
dissipated from everybody’s minds-except for the Kennedy brothers. 
Without the public, the press, or ExComm knowing, the Attorney General met with 
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, on Saturday evening, October 27, 
1962. Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin, “the President said that we are ready to consider the 
question of Turkey, to examine favorably the question of Turkey.”145 Robert Kennedy conveyed 
that if the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, the United States would 
dismantle its Jupiter missiles a few months after the resolution of the crisis. However, the deal 
was contingent on the Soviets not disclosing that a compromise took place. Robert Kennedy also 
warned Dobrynin that if Khrushchev did not accept this deal, the United States would be forced 
to escalate its response.146 
Khrushchev agreed to the terms of the missile swap, but at the time, the public did not 
have any knowledge of this secret arrangement. Kennedy responded with a public letter to 
Khrushchev, in which he pledged not to invade Cuba in exchange for the Soviets to remove their 
missiles from the Western Hemisphere. Khrushchev accepted the terms of the letter, and from 
the public’s perspective, the epistolary exchange between the superpowers effectuated the end of 
the crisis.147 
This secret deal is an anomaly in foreign policy negotiations for the fact that it was 
insulated from members of the White House, including ExComm and the vice president, for 
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several decades. Only nine people knew about the missile swap, and they did not disclose this 
secret until 1982 when the surviving participants to the deal jointly wrote a letter to Time 
magazine, in which they described their knowledge and participation in the secret missile 
swap.148Other presidents have kept secrets from the public for national security reasons or to 
protect a political reputation. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an exceptional case of government 
secrecy because members of the Kennedy administration kept the truth from the American public 
for over two decades, and today scholars, journalists, and national security advisors continue to 
correct the misconceptions of the crisis.  
Schwarz argues that there were legitimate foreign policy concerns for keeping the deal 
secret immediately after the missile crisis, but adherents to the deal harmed the public by keeping 
the deal a secret for several decades. Although the Jupiters were “a pile of junk”, removing them 
too quickly after the missile crisis would weaken NATO and make US allies doubt US 
resolve.149 Consequently, most historians and foreign policy analysts agree that Kennedy had 
substantial reasons for initially keeping the missile deal a secret. However, the prolonged secrecy 
of the missile swap appears to be largely motivated by political interests. During the crisis, only a 
small group in the White House knew about the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba before the 
president’s official announcement. Even White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger was 
unaware of the missiles in Cuba.150 Kennedy purposely kept Salinger in the dark, so if pressed by 
reporters, Salinger would not accidently leak any information to the press. 
If discovered by the press and the public, the secret missile deal would be detrimental to 
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Kennedy’s reputation. Most papers published during the crisis helped to restore Kennedy’s 
reputation as tough on Communism and Khrushchev. If the public found out that Kennedy had 
not actually defeated Khrushchev, but compromised with him instead, Kennedy’s political 
reputation would be ruined. In the Cold War era, there were no middle-of-the-road diplomatic 
strategies. The public, the press, and members of ExComm only perceived certain policies as 
“hard” or “soft.” This dichotomy permeated into the negotiating room, where Kennedy was 
forced to choose between a “hard” military strategy and a “soft” negotiation strategy. Lippman 
urged the president to use his platform to educate the average American citizen about the 
subtleties of foreign policy negotiations. Lippman asked Kennedy, “How do we describe our 
policy…to make people realize what they don’t realize at all, what it means to conduct great 
diplomatic affairs in the new and revolutionary nuclear age.”151 The era of a quick military 
victory was over. With the creation of nuclear weapons that have the capability to destroy the 
world, negotiations became the only viable strategy to resolve foreign policy crises. Despite the 
changing international landscape, Kennedy chose not to use his platform to educate the 
American public about the “differences between appeasement and negotiation.” Instead, 
Kennedy took advantage of the favorable political climate to privately brag that “[he] had cut his 
balls off.”152 
Instead of using the press as a platform to teach the American people about the 
complexities of foreign policy negotiations in the nuclear age, Kennedy omitted unsavory details 
from the public record to present his administration in a favorable light. Kennedy knew that the 
details published in newspapers would eventually become part of the historical record, so he 
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aimed to make his version the historical account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
An American Hero 
On Sunday, October 28, 1962, Khrushchev publicly announced that he would withdraw 
his missiles from Cuba in exchange for a non-invasion pledge by the United States. The fear that 
had gripped the nation for the past thirteen days suddenly dissipated, and the press hailed John F. 
Kennedy as an American hero. Kennedy’s successful standoff with the Soviet Union was 
declared by Time magazine as “one of the decisive moments in the twentieth century.”153 The 
New Yorker credited Kennedy’s “steady nerves “for bringing Khrushchev to his knees.154 And 
even the conservative Chicago Tribune seemed to have moved past criticizing Kennedy for his 
weak resolve, and instead had moved on to praising Kennedy for his “fighting attitude.”155 
Unbeknownst to the public and the press was the secret deal that Kennedy had planned to secure 
a successful resolution. In addition, Kennedy was willing to make the missile trade public if 
Khrushchev did not agree to his initial proposal. He had secretly contacted U Thant at the United 
Nations and told him to propose a missile trade if it seemed possible that Khrushchev was 
unwilling to back down. As Graham states, “the world trembled on what appeared to be the brink 
of nuclear war while only a few White House advisers saw all the cards in Kennedy’s hand.”156 
Stepping back from the brink, Kennedy once again began offering exclusive interviews to 
publicize his tough version of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Kennedy offered an exclusive interview to his friends Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop 
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of the Saturday Evening Post. Their retelling of the crisis soon became the official narrative of 
the thirteen days. Kennedy specifically chose these men to “provide an authoritative account of 
ExComm’s top secret sessions” because they promised to emphasize how the commander-in-
chief ran an “effective operation.”157 The article emphasized the president’s toughness, and it 
declared “a President’s nerve is the essential factor when the two great nuclear powers are 
‘eyeball to eyeball.”158 The article also criticized Adlai Stevenson for proposing to “trade 
American missiles in Turkey, Italy, and Great Britain for Soviet missiles in Cuba.”159 Kennedy 
specifically asked Bartlett and Alsop to include the criticism of Stevenson’s proposal in their 
article because it provided a cover-up for the missile swap that had resolved the crisis.160 Details 
that did not fit with the narrative of political toughness were edited out of the account, and 
Kennedy restricted this exclusive only to the few journalists he could trust. 
Although Kennedy had a press secretary, he continued to monitor the coverage of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis himself. As Salinger recalled, “Kennedy was in reality his own press 
secretary…He believed he could do it better than anyone else.”161 Kennedy continued to control 
the Cuban Missile Crisis narrative by commissioning Hugh Sidey, a reporter for Time, to write a 
campaign biography about his heroic handling of the missile crisis. In his interview with Sidey, 
Kennedy called the resolution of the crisis “easy” and he called the quarantine of Cuba 
“exciting.”162 Exempt from the record was the uncertainty and pressure that members of 
EXCOMM felt in their deliberations about Cuba. Accounts from ExComm administrators 
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emphasize how “calm and controlled” Kennedy acted throughout the duration of the crisis, but 
this is an inaccurate picture of how the deliberations proceeded. After an Assistant Secretary 
drove into a tree at 4:00 in the morning, Robert Kennedy stated, “the strain and the hours without 
sleep were beginning to take their toll…that kind of pressure does strange things to a human 
being.”163 John F. Kennedy was also beginning to wonder whether his advisers had suffered a 
mental collapse. 
Kennedy planned to use his renewed popularity in the next election cycle, but 
unfortunately, his political aspirations were cut short by his assassination in 1963. Kennedy took 
the secret of the missile swap with him to his grave, and his loyal advisers who had been privy to 
the secret denied in every forum that such a deal had taken place. President Kennedy, like most 
presidents, desired a favorable press, but his media management techniques went beyond merely 
mediating the truth to outright creating his own version of history. Kennedy may not have been 
as “tough” as reporters described him, but his media management techniques of restricting access 
to favorable reporters and influencing the story that they reported were so successful that 
Kennedy created his own personal legacy in the press. 
Although Kennedy died before the truth could be revealed, Kennedy’s lie had detrimental 
foreign and domestic policy consequences. The press’s portrayal of a nuclear standoff as a 
staring contest with winners and losers, and Schlesinger’s pernicious illusion that a tough resolve 
and cool control won foreign policy crises gave Americans an inaccurate understanding of the 
true nature of foreign policy crises. Foreign policy experts contend that the “no compromise” 
myth of the Cuban Missile Crisis continues to harm foreign policy negotiations today. For 
example in an article published in Foreign Policy, Leslie Gleb argued that because of the no-
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compromise myth of the Cuban Missile Crisis it “would be near political suicide to publicly 
suggest letting Iran enrich uranium up to an inconsequential five percent…though the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty permits it.” 164 
Historians, such as Frederick Schwarz and James McCartney, also argue that Kennedy’s 
lionization in the press pushed President Johnson to live up to Kennedy’s legacy. The press 
praised President Kennedy for refusing to compromise to Khrushchev, so if President Johnson 
made any compromises during the Vietnam War, the public would have perceived him as weak. 
I think that the strong media image of Kennedy may have been one of the factors that pushed 
Johnson to appear equally as tough in his foreign policy strategies, but I also think that a myriad 
of other factors contributed to Johnson’s Vietnam policies. Schwarz argues that “this was an 
extraordinary misuse of secrecy” because Johnson was deprived of the knowledge of how 
foreign policy negotiations were conducted. If he had been equipped with this knowledge, he 
may not have escalated the war so quickly. Nevertheless, Johnson’s motives in Vietnam are too 
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John F. Kennedy succeeded in building a legacy of savior, and after his assassination in 
1963, he became almost a martyr to the American people. If Kennedy had lived, the tough 
reputation he built during his short-term presidency would have certainly been tested. 
Technology was improving to such an extent that television news became the dominant 
communications medium after Kennedy’s assassination. This new technology offered reporters a 
way to test the president’s bold statements.166 If this technology had existed during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the public would have seen that the resolution was not as decisive as the president 
had declared because the Soviets still had 17,000 troops stationed in Cuba.167 While during the 
early 1960s, the press generally trusted the president, this sentiment changed during the Vietnam 
War, and journalists became more cynical of the president’s motives. Kennedy used the lack of 
intrusive technology to his advantage; he controlled the flow of information through the 
American printing press, but, Johnson and Nixon would have to deal with television technology 
that contradicted their claims. 
Kennedy’s media management techniques saved the world from nuclear war, but also the 
deliberate disinformation put forth by the Kennedy administration planted the myth that 
international crises could be solved by using the right amount of force. Kennedy’s influence over 
the media allowed him to withhold information until he was ready to share it, and his close 
friendship with Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop allowed him to edit the official narrative of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. By emphasizing his strengths and omitting his weaknesses, Kennedy 
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learned that he could use the press to shape the way that he would be remembered in history. 
Although, the Cuban Missile Crisis could most accurately be described as a draw, Kennedy was 
able to emerge from the crisis politically unscathed. He planned on taking this public adulation 
with him to the polls, but his political motivations were stopped because of his death. 
Nevertheless, Kennedy’s assassination made him even more of a hero, and journalists continued 
to write about his victory after his death. 
Kennedy’s media management techniques also had the negative consequences of pushing 
him to policies that he did not want to pursue. Cuba became the dominant concern of the 1962 
election, and Kennedy campaigned on the platform of a tough Cuban policy. When the public 
became aware of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October 1962, it was paramount that the Kennedy 
administration get them out. As ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith stated, “once [the missiles] 
were there, the political needs of the Kennedy administration urged it to take almost any risk to 
get them out.”168 The military significance of the missiles was almost immaterial to the Kennedy 
administration’s desperation to remove the missiles because national reputation was at stake 
during the crisis as much as any actual threat. Political concerns were so significant to Kennedy 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis that he confided to his brother his worries that he would have 
been impeached if he had done nothing about the missiles.169 
Many historians have come to the consensus that journalists are to blame for letting the 
Cuban Missile myth exist in the historical record unchecked. Graham argues that Bartlett and 
Alsop neglected their constitutional duty by letting the president edit the first account of the 
crisis, and James McCartney argues that journalists embellished the myth by advancing the 
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propaganda of the Kennedy administration.170 While journalists helped to advance the 
administration’s agenda, they cannot be entirely blamed for filtering information during a 
national security crisis. Kennedy was a master manipulator and he perfected the art of media 
relations. He cultivated a circle of elite journalists, and he incentivized them with tidbits of 
information for favorable press coverage. Kennedy used the papers as a forum for framing his 
political agenda; he emphasized his successes and omitted his shortcomings from the public 
record.  
Many historians have questioned whether such deception could happen now, and the 
conclusions they have reached are mixed. On the one hand, since the late 1960s, journalists and 
government investigations have decreased the level of secrecy. Government secrets are intended 
to protect the American people, but Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair are two striking 
examples of a president misusing his presidential power. Presidents have also taken a proactive 
approach to limiting government secrets through the creation of Jimmy Carter’s Information 
Security Oversight Office and the establishment of Bill Clinton’s commission on government 
secrecy.171 In addition, the technological revolution of the post-9/11 period has rendered it 
almost impossible for the government to keep secrets from its people.172 Yet, there are still 
instances of unchecked government secrecy as Edward Snowden’s 2013 allegations against the 
NSA illustrate.173 The invention of computers and cell phones allows information to be shared 
almost instantaneously, and digital storage makes it impossible for a file to ever truly be 
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On the other hand, secrecy is a central component of the modern state. “Secrecy begets 
higher levels of secrecy” as more and more documents are labeled classified and codeword 
protected from prying eyes.174 The historical record also indicates that in every foreign policy 
crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the critical faculties of the media shut down during terse 
foreign policy negotiations. The American media continued its press strategy of supporting the 
president during the Vietnam War, and it was not until the Tet Offensive that journalists became 
more skeptical of the president’s policies. Notwithstanding, the government continued to monitor 
press coverage during President Reagan’s Grenada Invasion, President Bush’s invasion, and the 
coverage of the Persian Gulf War. Eliot O. Cohen, a professor of strategic studies at Johns 
Hopkins University declares the Persian Gulf War as “a victory over journalists.”175 The lessons 
learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis was that whenever national security is at stake, the press 
should support the president’s policies to protect the safety of the nation. As the press continue to 
be an active participant to the conversations surrounding foreign policy, there continues to be 
debate about the role that the press should play during foreign policy crises. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis is unique to the extent that press coverage of the crisis was predominantly in the printing 
press, and the president cultivated a special relationship with influential journalists to shape his 
legacy. Nevertheless, foreign policy crises continue to plague our society, and the solution is not 
as black and white as disclosing all secrets or creating an insular governing elite. Rather, the 
press and the public should have access to classified information once a crisis has passed. 
Otherwise, society runs the risk of never truly understanding the complexities of foreign policy 
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